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Abstract
Recent works have demonstrated convolutional neural networks are vulnerable
to adversarial examples, i.e., inputs to machine learning models that an attacker
has intentionally designed to cause the models to make a mistake. To improve
the adversarial robustness of neural networks, adversarial training has been pro-
posed to train networks by injecting adversarial examples into the training data.
However, adversarial training could overfit to a specific type of adversarial at-
tack and also lead to standard accuracy drop on clean images. To this end,
we propose a novel Class-Aware Domain Adaptation (CADA) method for ad-
versarial defense without directly applying adversarial training. Specifically, we
propose to learn domain-invariant features for adversarial examples and clean
images via a domain discriminator. Furthermore, we introduce a class-aware
component into the discriminator to increase the discriminative power of the
network for adversarial examples. We evaluate our newly proposed approach
using multiple benchmark datasets. The results demonstrate that our method
can significantly improve the state-of-the-art of adversarial robustness for vari-
ous attacks and maintain high performances on clean images.
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1. Introduction
Recent works [1, 2] have shown that deep neural networks are vulnerable
to adversarial examples, which are maliciously designed inputs to attack target
models by adding small perturbations to clean images. Although the adversar-
ial perturbations are often imperceptible to humans, these adversarial attacks
are highly effective against state-of-the-art deep neural networks (DNNs) [3, 4].
Moreover, adversarial examples can transfer across different models and main-
tain their effectiveness. The success of adversarial attacks have lead to potential
threat for security sensitive deep learning systems. Thus, how to effectively im-
prove adversarial robustness of deep learning models is crucial for real-world
applications such as autonomous driving [5] as well as identity authentication
[6].
Adversarial training constitutes the current state-of-the-art method to de-
fend against adversarial attacks. The key idea is to train a target model on
adversarial examples and corresponding class labels at the same time. It can
be interpreted as a new kind of data augmentation approaches. Previous works
[1, 7, 8] have shown that adversarial training can effectively increase the adver-
sarial robustness of deep neural networks, especially against white-box attacks.
However, most existing adversarial training methods could be also problematic.
First, there is a risk of overfitting to the perturbations crafted with a specific
attack [8], thus the trained model may not generalize well to adversarial exam-
ples from other attacks and different test datasets. Second, standard accuracy
on clean images often drops as a result of adversarial training, which is unde-
sirable. The trade-off between adversarial robustness and standard accuracy
must be taken into account when designing defense methods against adversarial
attacks.
In this paper, we propose a novel defense method against adversarial attacks
from the perspective of domain adaptation. This is motivated by the observa-
tion that there is a considerable distribution mismatch between the clean images
and adversarial examples in the high-level feature space. The adversarial per-
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turbations can be progressively amplified to a large magnitude in higher layers
of a target model and eventually result in wrong predictions [9]. To mitigate
the domain shift, we propose a Class-Aware Domain Adaptation (CADA) ap-
proach to improve the robustness of deep convolutional networks against various
adversarial attacks. In particular, we propose to train a discriminator for un-
supervised domain adaptation to minimize the H-divergence [10] between clean
images and adversarial examples. In this way, the trained models can learn
robust features that are domain-invariant, which can effectively improve the
adversarial robustness. Moreover, we incorporate a class-aware component into
the discriminator to exploit the label information of adversarial examples. It can
increase the discriminative power of the target model for adversarial examples.
The main contribution of this work can be summarized as follows:
• We formulate the adversarial defense as a domain adaptation problem and
propose a novel Class-Aware Domain Adaptation framework to improve
the adversarial robustness of deep neural networks.
• We achieve effective adversarial defense by using a domain discriminator to
reduce the distribution mismatch between the representations of adversar-
ial examples and clean images. Furthermore, we make the discriminator
class-aware by exploiting the label information of adversarial examples,
which helps the target model to learn more discriminative features for
adversarial examples.
• Evaluated on different benchmark datasets, our method significantly im-
proves the state-of-the-art in terms of adversarial robustness against dif-
ferent attacks and also maintains high accuracy on clean images.
2. Related Work
In this section, we first specify some of the notations used in this paper
and then provide a brief review of current methods on adversarial attacks and
defenses.
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2.1. Notation
In this paper, we use x to denote the clean image in a dataset (either train or
test set) and y to denote the class label. The ground-truth is denoted by ytrue.
We consider neural network based classifier f : x→ y as our target model. For
convenience, let φ(x) be the feature extraction mapping (the last layer of neural
network before fully connected layer) of the input image x. J(f(x), y) is used to
denote the loss function of classification. xadv denotes the adversarial example
generated by perturbing the clean image x.  is the magnitude of the adversarial
perturbation.
2.2. Attacks
Attacks are commonly divided into two types based on the amount of in-
formation that an attacker can obtain: White-box attacks have the full infor-
mation about the target model including architecture, parameters, gradients,
etc. Black-box attacks have very limited knowledge about the target model and
cannot send queries to obtain more information.
The seminal work [1] first shows that deep neural networks are vulnerable to
adversarial examples and demonstrates adversarial attacks can be transferred
across different deep learning models. Since then, more adversarial attacks have
been proposed to fool deep convolutional neural networks. Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [2] is introduced to attack a classifier by using the gradients
of the loss with respect to the input images. This method tries to maximize
the loss function to find the adversarial examples by running gradient ascent for
one iteration:
xadv = x+  · sign(∇xJ(f(x), ytrue)) (1)
As a single step attack, FGSM is able to generate adversarial examples effi-
ciently. Following works [11] discover the label leaking effect of FGSM and
suggest to replace ground-truth labels with the predicted ones of the target
model.
In addition, iterative attacks are introduced to provide much stronger at-
tacks. Basic Iterative Method (BIM) uses a similar formulation as FGSM,
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however it runs the gradient ascent optimization for multiple iterations and
applies small perturbations in each iteration [11]. Using subscript to denote the
iteration number and α for the attack step, BIM can be formulated as
xadv0 = x (2)
xadvt+1 = x
adv
t + α · sign(∇xadvt J(f(xadvt ), ytrue)) (3)
xadvt+1 = clip(x
adv
t+1, x
adv
t+1 − , xadvt+1 + ) (4)
where clip(·, a, b) makes sure its input to reside in the range [a, b].
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack [7] is a similar iterative attack by
projecting the perturbed images into the feasible solution space, which ensures
a maximum per-pixel perturbation being no greater than  (that is subject to an
L∞). Different from BIM, PGD consists of initializing search at a random point
within a limited area of the original images. As a result, the noisy initialized
point can help create a much stronger attack than previous iterative methods.
Moreover, PGD has been widely used to investigate the adversarial robustness
of deep neural networks.
Recently other types of adversarial attacks are also proposed to fool deep
neural networks. One pixel attack [12] is introduced by modifying only one
pixel based on differential evolution. Simple rotating 2D images [13] are also
used to fool neural network-based vision systems. Translation-invariant attack
[14] is proposed to produce more transferable adversarial examples, and adver-
sarial examples in the physical world can be produced by printing the digitally
perturbed image on paper [15]. Moreover, adversarial attacks have been used
to fool the object detector [16].
2.3. Defenses
With the advancement of attack techniques, many adversarial defense tech-
niques have been also developed. Adversarial training [2, 8, 7] is one of the
most investigated defense methods against adversarial attacks by augmenting
the training dataset with adversarial examples. Adversarial training can effec-
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tively improve the adversarial robustness of the target model by learning the
perturbation pattern.
FGSM adversaries are first used by adversarial training to defend a single
step adversarial attack [2]. Other works [7, 8] try to improve the robustness
against iterative attacks such as BIM and PGD. Adversarial Logit Pairing (ALP)
is proposed to enhance adversarial training by encouraging the logit predictions
of a network for a clean image and its adversarial counterpart to be similar
[17]. A feature denoising architecture [18] is proposed to further improve the
effectiveness of adversarial training. A new defense method, TRADES [19],
is designed with a theoretical analysis of the trade-off between accuracy and
adversarial robustness. It is also possible to achieve adversarial defenses by
using Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [20], knowledge distillation [21],
high-level representation guided denoiser [9], image patches denoising [22], noise
injection [23] and convolutional sparse coding [24]. More recently, ATDA [25]
is proposed to improve the generalization of adversarial training by minimizing
the gap between the clean images and adversarial examples. Their work forces
the similarity between the logits predictions of clean images and adversarial
examples through conventional methods such as covariance matrix alignment.
In contrast, our model focuses on reducing the distribution mismatch between
the distributions of adversarial examples and clean images in the feature space
by a domain discriminator.
3. Our Method
We propose a Class-Aware Domain Adaptation method to deal with adver-
sarial attacks from the perspective of domain adaptation. Specifically, we use a
domain discriminator to align the feature distributions of clean images and ad-
versarial examples based on H-divergence [26] theory and implement it based on
generative adversarial training [27]. Moreover, we make the discriminator class-
aware to increase the discriminative power of the target model for adversarial
images.
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Figure 1: Overview of our model. f is a conventional image classification network. The left
part is a stack of convolutional blocks φ for feature extraction and is shared for both clean
and adversarial images. The bottom right is our discriminator with 4 fully connected layers.
3.1. Distribution Alignment
H-divergence [10, 26, 28] is used to measure the divergence between two sets
of data with different distributions. Let zs and zt be the distributions from
source domain (D) and target domain (D′) respectively. We denote a labeling
function h : z → [0, 1] as a domain classifier and H as a set of possible domain
classifiers, where h ∈ H. Therefore, the H-divergence between D and D′ is:
dH(D,D′) = 2
(
1−min
h∈H
[ 1
N
∑
z
LD(h(z)) + 1
N
∑
z
LD′(h(z))
])
(5)
where LD and LD′ denote the prediction errors (cross-entropy loss) of h(z) on
source and target domain respectively. N is the number of samples for a given
dataset.
Under the context of deep learning, z represents the feature representation
of an input image x extracted from a neural network, i.e., z = φ(x). In order
to align the distributions between D and D′, we need to optimize φ to output
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feature representations that minimize the domain divergence dH(D,D′), which
leads to a minimax game between φ and h:
min
φ
dH(D,D′)⇔ max
φ
min
h∈H
[ 1
N
∑
z
LD(h(z)) + 1
N
∑
z
LD′(h(z))
]
(6)
3.2. Domain Adaptation
We seek to improve the adversarial robustness of deep neural networks from
the perspective of domain adaptation. It is achieved by reducing the distribu-
tion mismatch between clean images and adversarial examples on the feature
space based on H-divergence theory above. In particular, we refer to the do-
main of clean images as source domain and the domain of adversarial examples
as target domain. Our discriminator produces probability distributions over
domain labels, hd : z → hd(z). In addition, we follow LSGAN [29] to replace
the negative log likelihood objective by a least square loss. Thus, the domain
adaptation objective can be formulated as:
Lada(φ, hd) = 1
N
[∑
x
(
hd(φ(x))− 1
)2
+
∑
xadv
hd(φ(x
adv))2
]
(7)
where φ tries to output similar feature representations φ(xadv) and φ(x) for both
adversarial examples and clean images, while hd aims to distinguish between
φ(xadv) and φ(x). In other words, φ tries to minimize this objective, while hd
tries to maximize it.
3.3. Class-Aware Discriminator
Even though the binary discriminator has the capability of aligning all the
clean images and adversarial examples into a similar feature space, it could suffer
from the problem of mode collapse and there is no guarantee that the adversarial
examples with the same class label would be mapped nearby in the feature space.
To this end, we add an auxiliary classifier on top of the binary discriminator
by utilizing the label information in the adversarial domain. As a result, it can
help the adversarial examples to preserve their categorical information. Our
class-aware discriminator can produce the probability over both domain labels
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as well as class labels for adversarial examples, h : z → {hd(z), hc(z)}. Thus,
the classification loss of adversarial examples is defined as:
Ladvcls (φ, hc) =
1
N
∑
xadv
J
(
hc(φ(x
adv)), ytrue
)
(8)
3.4. Full Objective
By defining the classification loss of the clean images as:
Lcls(f) = 1
N
∑
x
J
(
f(x), ytrue
)
(9)
our full objective is:
L(f, φ, hc, hd) = Lcls(f) + λ1Ladvcls (φ, hc) + λ2Lada(φ, hd) (10)
where the λ1 and λ2 control the relative importance of the different objectives.
We aim to solve:
f∗, h∗ = arg min
f,φ,hc
max
hd
L(f, φ, hc, hd) (11)
Notice that φ is part of f for feature extraction. Discriminator h consists of
hd and hc, which share all the parameters except the last fully connected layer.
We achieve the joint optimization of Equation 11 by switching domain labels
between clean images and adversarial examples similar to GAN training [27].
3.5. Network Overview
The overview of our network is shown in Figure 1. Our class-aware dis-
criminator can be integrated with a conventional image classification network
f , which is illustrated in the upper part of Figure 1. The left part is a stack of
convolutional blocks φ for feature extraction and is shared for both clean and
adversarial images. The bottom right is our discriminator which consists of 4
fully connected layers and is added after the feature extraction blocks. The
dimension of all the hidden layers of the discriminator is set as the same as that
of the extracted features. The whole system can be trained in an end-to-end
manner using SGD optimization. During testing phase, the discriminator can
be removed and we can use the target classification network with robust weights.
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4. Experiment
In this section, we evaluate CADA on various widely used benchmarks and
compare against recent methods for adversarial defenses. Experimental analysis
and ablation study are also provided.
4.1. Experiment Setup
Following previous works [7, 17], we use PGD to generate adversarial exam-
ples on-the-fly in every training iteration. We evaluate the classification accu-
racy on test images that are adversarially perturbed by FGSM, BIM and PGD
respectively. In this work, all the attacks are considered to consist of pertur-
bations of limited L∞ norm with an allowed maximum value of . Adversarial
Robustness Toolbox [30] is used to produce adversarial examples.
We evaluate the proposed approach on MNIST, CIFAR10 and CIFAR100
datasets under both the white-box and black-box attack settings. For black-box
attacks, we evaluate the trained model with adversarial examples transferred
from a copy of the same classification model, which is independently initialized
and trained.
For all the experiments, the image pixel values are normalized to [0, 1]. We
set the weighting parameters λ1 = 0.5, λ2 = 0.5 to train MNIST and CIFAR10,
and use λ1 = 0.5, λ2 = 1.0 for CIFAR100. All the models are trained by using
Adam [31] for stochastic optimization with a batch size of 64 and a total of 250
epochs. The initial learning rate is set to 3×10−4 and decreased by 10× at the
150th epoch. Our implementation is based on deep learning framework PyTorch
with a single GTX 1080Ti GPU.
4.2. Experimental Results
We compare our CADA approach with state-of-the-art adversarial defense
methods ALP [17] and TRADES [19]. In addition, we use Vanilla to represent
the model trained with clean images, and AT to denote the Adversarial Training
[7] with both the clean images and adversarially perturbed images produced by
PGD attack.
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Table 1: Test accuracy on clean images and adversarial examples under various white-box and
black-box attacks. We set the total adversarial perturbation  = 0.3 and number of iterations
K = 40 for BIM and PGD attacks on MNIST datasets. We set  = 0.031 and K = 20 for
CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 datasets. The perturbation of FGSM is the same as BIM and PGD.
Dataset Defense Clean(%)
White-box attack (%) Black-box attack (%)
FGSM BIM PGD FGSM BIM PGD
MNIST
Vanilla 99.16 14.06 0.74 0.75 14.10 0.74 0.74
AT 99.15 96.63 71.87 94.56 97.13 78.52 95.69
ALP 98.30 96.40 88.26 96.11 96.64 89.91 96.27
TRADES 98.95 96.88 89.00 95.79 96.91 91.64 96.01
CADA 98.80 98.57 98.52 98.09 98.62 98.84 98.56
CIFAR10
Vanilla 92.66 25.65 9.26 7.31 44.34 15.15 18.42
AT 86.28 63.05 33.18 48.96 75.01 57.32 72.68
ALP 83.82 62.07 33.51 53.21 72.47 50.50 71.88
TRADES 84.22 69.54 40.50 54.85 75.26 64.58 73.05
CADA 86.55 73.93 71.31 71.59 78.00 75.43 78.37
CIFAR100
Vanilla 72.46 25.68 11.15 9.16 37.01 35.88 33.48
AT 57.58 33.53 19.82 27.91 48.05 37.72 48.25
ALP 58.20 35.52 22.02 28.96 46.20 37.60 46.61
TRADES 59.32 36.51 25.92 29.29 48.61 36.88 48.46
CADA 67.81 41.69 26.73 29.42 49.84 40.53 48.63
4.2.1. Results on MNIST.
The LeNet [32] is used as the target classification model. We set the total
adversarial perturbation  = 0.3, perturbation step size η = 0.01 and number of
iterations K = 40 for training. To evaluate the robust accuracy on adversarial
images, we apply BIM and PGD attacks with K = 40 iterations and η = 0.01
step size. The results are summarized in the upper part of Table 1. We can see
that although all the defense methods are able to retain high accuracy on clean
images, our CADA approach generalizes much better on adversarial examples.
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Table 2: The comparisons of CADA with ATDA [25] on CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 test
dataset. The total adversarial perturbation  = 4/255 and number of iterations K = 20.
Dataset Defense Clean (%)
White-box attack (%) Black-box attack (%)
FGSM PGD FGSM PGD
CIFAR10
ATDA 84.8 60.7 58.1 80.7 80.7
CADA 86.5 76.3 73.8 82.7 82.6
CIFAR100
ATDA 61.6 29.3 26.2 56.0 56.0
CADA 63.9 36.1 30.3 57.7 57.9
In particular, we can achieve over 98% robust accuracy for all the attacks.
4.2.2. Results on CIFAR10.
We apply the pre-activation ResNet-18 [33] for image classification. We set
the total perturbation  = 0.031, perturbation step size η = 0.003 and number
of iterations K = 10 for training. For evaluation, we apply BIM and PGD
attacks with K = 20 iterations and  = 0.031 perturbations. The results of the
test accuracy are shown in the middle part of Table 1. It shows that our CADA
method is significantly better than other defense methods. We can achieve more
than 70% accuracy for all the white-box attacks, while ALP can only achieve
62.07%, 33.51% and 53.21% accuracy on FGSM, BIM and PGD adversaries re-
spectively. It also shows that CADA can outperform all the competing methods
on all the adversaries under the black-box setting. Furthermore, we evaluate
our method under the same attack setting as ATDA [25]. As shown in Table 2,
our method can outperform ATDA by a clear margin.
4.2.3. Results on CIFAR100.
We also use the pre-activation ResNet-18 as classification model for CI-
FAR100 dataset and the output size of the last layer is changed to 100. We
adopt the training settings as the same as CIFAR10 dataset, and apply BIM
and PGD attacks with K = 20 iterations and  = 0.031 perturbations for eval-
uation. The results are shown in the bottom part of Table 1. Moreover, the
comparison with ATDA is shown in Table 2. It is clear that our CADA method
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outperforms other methods under both white-box and black-box settings.
4.2.4. Adversarial Robustness v.s. Standard Accuracy.
We further investigate the trade-off between the robustness on adversarial
examples and standard accuracy on clean images. As shown in the third column
of Table 1, training robust models with adversarial examples generally lead to a
reduction of standard accuracy on clean images. However, it can be seen that our
models can retain relatively higher accuracy on clean images than other defense
methods. In particular, our model only has a slight reduction in clean accuracy
to 67.81% (72.46% for Vanilla training) on CIFAR100 images, while there are
more than 13% accuracy drop for other methods. The reason is that our robust
models are not directly trained on classification loss of adversarial examples
(see Equation 10). The labels of adversarial examples are only served as a kind
of regularization via the discriminator, thus reducing the risk of overfitting on
adversarial perturbations for the target model.
4.2.5. Different Types of Attacks.
Although all the defense methods are only trained with PGD adversaries, our
method generalizes much better across different types of adversarial attacks. As
shown in Table 1, we can see that ALP and TRADES are able to achieve 96.11%
and 95.79% accuracy on MNIST dataset with PGD adversaries under white-box
setting, however they can only reach 88.26% and 89.00% accuracy with BIM
attack respectively. In contrast, our CADA can achieve robust accuracy as high
as 98.52% under the same setting, and generalizes well for black-box attacks.
Moreover, the superiority of our method can be also observed when evaluating
CIFAR images. In particular, our method can achieve similar accuracy around
71% under both BIM and PGD white-box attacks for CIFAR10 images. However
the accuracy drops considerably for other defense methods when tested on BIM
adversaries, e.g., decreasing from 53.21% to 33.51% for ALP.
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Figure 2: Feature visualizations by t-SNE for CIFAR10 test images. Vanilla in the first
row represents the results with standard training. The second to the fifth row correspond to
different defense methods AT, ALP, TRADES and CADA respectively. The first to the fourth
column correspond to clean images as well as adversarial examples produced by the white-box
FGSM, BIM and PGD attacks.
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Figure 3: Performance comparison of different variants of our model on CIFAR10. We compare
the classification accuracies on the test set with FGSM, BIM and PGD attacks under both
white-box and black-box settings.
4.3. Distribution Visualization
We further investigate the distribution of the feature representations pro-
duced by different defense methods. In particular, we use t-Distributed Stochas-
tic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE) [34] to visualize the structure of the high-
dimensional image representations by giving each image a location in a two-
dimensional map. t-SNE is capable of arranging images that have similar high-
dimensional vectors to be nearby in the embedded space. We consider different
defense methods as well as adversarial examples produced by various white-box
attacks.
As shown in Figure 2, the extracted features of CIFAR10 test images are
visualized as a scatterplot in which the colors represent the labels of different
categories. The first row shows the results of Vanilla training with only clean
images. We can see that the clean images can be well separated into their natural
clusters and the adversarial examples are clustered with the wrong classes.
The second to the fourth row correspond to the results of 3 different defense
methods AT, ALP and TRADES. It can be seen that the maps constructed
for clean images are significantly better and most of the members of each class
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Figure 4: Performance comparison of different variants of our model on CIFAR100. We
compare the classification accuracies on the test set with FGSM, BIM and PGD attacks
under both white-box and black-box settings.
fairly close together. However the results produced for adversarial examples
provide little insight into the class structure of the dataset since there are large
overlaps between different classes. In contrast, the t-SNE visualization based on
our CADA is able to construct a map in which the separation between different
classes is almost perfect. It is clear that our method does a much better job
to reveal the categorical information of the CIFAR10 dataset. Moreover, our
t-SNE maps exhibit the similar distribution structures for both clean images
and different adversarial examples, demonstrating that our method can learn
domain-invariant features for both clean images and adversarial examples. As
a result, our method is able to balance well between adversarial robustness and
standard accuracy.
4.4. Ablation Study
We demonstrate the necessity of the two components of our method by
comparing the adversarial robustness of several ablated versions of CADA. We
use DA to denote the trained model with Domain Adaptation component only
and CA to represent the model with Class-Aware component only.
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Figure 5: Test loss and accuracy for clean images and PGD adversaries with domain adapta-
tion component on MNIST dataset.
The ablation results are shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4 for CIFAR10 and
CIFAR100 respectively. Specifically, compared with Vanilla training, the classi-
fication performance can be significantly improved with both CA and DA. The
improvements generalize well across different adversarial attacks under both
white-box and black-box settings. This proves that both domain adaptation
component and class-aware component can effectively improve the adversarial
robustness of classification models, and the best performances are achieved with
CADA by combining the two components. Moreover, the high performance of
DA demonstrates that the adversarial robustness can be significantly improved
even without the labels of the adversarial examples.
We also observe that there are several obvious performance drops for CA
under BIM attack for both CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 images, while DA exhibits
more stable improvements under both BIM and PGD attacks. Considering
that all the models are trained with PGD adversaries, it can be concluded that
domain adaptation component plays a key role in learning domain-invariant
features and generalizing well on various attacks.
Furthermore, we provide an empirical study on the evolution of the effec-
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tiveness of DA model over time. We calculate the loss and accuracy for clean
images and PGD adversaries on MNIST test set and plot them against epochs
in Figure 5. We can find that the loss of PGD adversaries increases rapidly in
the early stage of training, then it decreases over time. The robust accuracy
of adversaries consistently increases and finally converges to a high value. In
contrast, the loss of clean images keeps small but gradually increases a little bit
over time, while the standard accuracy converges to a high value after just a
few epochs. It is clear that the domain adaptation component can gradually
learn domain-invariant features for adversarial examples and clean images. As
a result, it helps reduce the risk of overfitting to clean images and improve the
adversarial robustness of deep networks.
Finally, we compare the structures of image representations of DA and CA
by applying t-SNE to CIFAR10 test dataset. We adopt PGD white-box attack
to generate adversarial examples. As shown in Figure 6, the t-SNE maps exhibit
different structures for DA and CA. In particular, DA produces a separate map
by constructing a “curve” shape for the data points of a given class, while CA
tends to cluster the images of the same class to nearby points.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a new defense method for improving the
adversarial robustness of deep convolutional networks with class-aware domain
adaptation. The proposed approach outperforms the state-of-the-art by a large
margin in terms of both adversarial robustness and standard accuracy. The ex-
perimental results on several benchmark datasets demonstrate that our method
also generalizes well across various adversarial attacks under both white-box
and black-box settings.
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DA CA
Figure 6: Feature visualization comparison by t-SNE between Domain Adaptation (DA) and
Class-Aware (CA) model. The results are produced on CIFAR10 test images with PGD
white-box attack.
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